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Abstract:  The intermediate market for raw fish is characterized by time and space considerations that create significant 
quasi-rents between the fisher and the initial processor(s) approached to complete an exchange. This “temporal specificity” 
is more pronounced the fewer the number of alternative potential buyers, the more perishable the catch and the more 
geographically dispersed the alternative buyers. Owing to the costly strategic behavior that often accompanies large quasi-
rents, “on-the-spot” negotiations are likely to result in a negative return for a fisher investing in technologies that lead to 
pronounced temporal specificity problems. An empirical study by Koss (1999) supports the hypothesis that reciprocal ex 
ante specific investment costs are incurred by some processors in order to reduce the probability of ex post holdup. This 
paper explores the implications that the above finding has for fishery management policies. In particular, if the goal of 
fishery management is to maximize the value of the fishery, then policy should not hinder the use of contractual tools that 
serve to accommodate or promote efficient transactions. The dilemma facing policy-makers, however, is that such tools 
often simultaneously lead to an increase in the concentration of market power among a small group of processors. Several 
existing policy alternatives are evaluated according to their tendency to accommodate or inhibit the use of reciprocal 
exposure to promote efficient exchanges. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION   
Economists have long recognized the existence of the 
hold-up problem: “the general business problem in which 
each party to a contract worries about being forced to 
accept disadvantageous terms later, after it has sunk an 
investment, or worries that its investment may be 
devalued by the actions of others (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992: 136). If either of the parties refuses to undertake 
the initial requisite investment(s), a potentially Pareto-
improving exchange will not obtain; thus market failure 
occurs. 
Williamson (1983), in developing his ‘hostage model,’ 
examines an intermediate product market in which self-
enforcing agreements involve ‘credible commitments.’ 
He maintains that one way to avoid market failure is to 
expand the contractual relation by devising a mutual 
reliance relation. That is, the buyer may reciprocally 
invest in specific capital that has value only in servicing 
the final demands for the product in question. If the non-
salvageable value of the advance commitment undertaken 
by the buyer equals that of the supplier, an efficient 
exchange result will emerge. Koss and Eaton (1997) 
formally demonstrate Williamson’s contention that the 
efficiency of a contract may be endogenously enforced by 
a mutual reliance relation.  
Koss (1999) empirically tests the importance of 
transaction-specific investments in determining contract 
choice in the intermediate market for raw fish. Contracts 
between fishers and processors in British Columbia for 
the 1988 fishing season are of two general types: spot-
market arrangements, and ex ante agreements. With a 
spot contract, buyers and sellers of fish seek one another 
after incurring seasonal investments (e.g., vessel 
maintenance, crew, processing facilities, etc.); there is no 
prior agreement for exchange, nor is there an agreement 
the relationship will continue beyond the transaction.
1  
With ex ante agreements, the parties agree to trade with 
one another, perhaps exclusively, prior to either party 
incurring seasonal start-up costs. These agreements 
typically have non-price compensation mechanisms such 
as financing of vessels by processors, and provision by 
processors of ancillary gear and services and/or the vessel 
itself. 
The analysis tested the hypothesis that ex ante 
investments undertaken by some fishers result in a 
“temporal specificity”
2 problem; reciprocal specific 
investment costs are then incurred by some processors so 
as to credibly commit to the implicit contractual 
agreement. This reciprocal exposure is accomplished 
through ex ante processor investment specific to the 
harvesting operation. IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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2. TEMPORAL  SPECIFICITY,  HOLD-UP 
AND RECIPROCAL EXPOSURE IN THE 
INTERMEDIATE MARKET FOR RAW 
FISH 
Upon entry into the B.C. fishing industry, participants in 
both the harvesting and processing sectors may choose 
among several different technologies. Entry into the 
harvesting sector requires a fisher to choose from among 
several technologies, hi ￿ [h1, . . . hn], each characterized 
by some combination of input choices (i.e., vessel, gear-
type, crew size, etc.), and each requiring different levels 
of fixed investment. Similarly, a fish buyer selects from 
among the alternative processing technologies, pj ￿ [p1, . 
. ., pm] by incurring a fixed investment cost. Let IF
i and Ib
j 
denote the amortized investments undertaken by a fisher 
investing in technology hi and a buyer investing in 
technology pj, respectively. Harvesting and processing 
investments are combined through a series of exchanges 
over several fishing seasons. The value of these combined 
initial investments is realized when the buyer sells the 
processed product to a final consumer. Not all 
configurations of harvesting/processing technologies are 
valuable. Let R
ij be the maximum expected gross 
(amortized) value of an exchange between a fisher 
choosing technology hi and a processor choosing 
technology  pj.
3 If R
ij t IF
i + IB
j, efficiency considerations 
dictate that such an exchange should take place.  
The extent to which harvesting and processing 
investments are relation-specific, depends upon the 
values of these investments in alternative exchanges. Let 
VF
i denote the ex post opportunity cost of the fisher’s 
investment. Any harvesting technology which results in 
IF
i > VF
i is considered a specific investment; the greater 
is the difference (IF
i - VF
i), the higher is degree of 
specificity embodied in the harvesting operation.  
The issue of temporal specificity arises here: the 
intermediate market for raw fish is characterized by time 
and space considerations that create significant quasi-
rents (R
ij - VF
i - VB
j) between the fisher and the initial 
processor(s) approached to complete the exchange. This 
specificity is more pronounced the fewer are the number 
of alternative potential buyers, the more perishable is the 
catch and the more geographically dispersed are 
alternative buyers.  
The size of VF
i , and thus the severity of temporal 
specificity, is in turn affected by the nature of the fisher’s 
ex ante choice of harvesting technology: the more 
inflexible is the technology, hi, across fisheries or across 
species within a fishery, the lower is VF
i; the more 
perishable is the intermediate product produced by hi, the 
lower is VF
i; harvesting technologies that restrict the 
processing techniques to which the intermediate product 
is suitable result in a lower ex post opportunity cost. 
The  ex post opportunity cost of a buyer’s initial 
investment, VB
j, varies across processing technologies. 
Those technologies which are inflexible across species 
and/or cannot be easily redeployed to non-fish products 
will have a lower expected value in an alternative use.  
With such large quasi-rents, a fisher and a processor may 
be induced to engage in costly strategic behavior that 
renders “on the spot” contracting inefficient. Owing to 
the perishability of the intermediate product as well as 
the geographic dispersion of both buyers and sellers, 
these quasi-rents can be dissipated quite rapidly as each 
transactor attempts to capture a larger share.  
There are some harvesting technologies that, although 
economically efficient, put the fisher at risk of hold-up: 
that is, “on the spot’ negotiations are likely to result in a 
negative return for a fisher investing in technologies that 
lead to pronounced temporal specificity problems. Such a 
situation is depicted in Figure 1, where the length of the 
line segment, OF0B represents the gross revenue 
obtainable from a transaction between a particular fisher 
and buyer. The fisher and buyer incur ex ante 
(amortized) seasonal investment costs of 0FIF and 0BIB, 
respectively. Suppose ex post opportunity costs are given 
by 0FVF and 0BVB. An equal division of the quasirent at 
(NF, NB), which, for example, would obtain under ex post 
Nash bargaining, leaves the fisher with a negative return 
on his or her initial investment. Under these 
circumstances, the fisher is likely to recognize the 
potential for ex post hold-up and will be unwilling to 
incur the ex ante investment cost. This is identified as a 
market failure, since this transaction is Pareto superior 
to all alternative transactions.  
This market failure can be corrected if, ex ante, the buyer 
undertakes a portion of the fisher’s investment cost. For 
example, if the buyer takes over $G of the fisher’s ex ante 
investment cost, the ex post division of the quasi-rent 
allows both parties to receive a positive return on their 
initial investments. 
It is a combination of vessel and gear characteristics that 
determines the extent of ex post temporal specificity. Five 
gear-types are employed in the four fisheries under 
consideration (salmon, halibut, sablefish, herring): purse-
seine, gillnet, troll, longline and trap.
4 First consider the 
flexibility of gear-type across species. The purse-seine 
and gillnet gear-types are employed in both the salmon 
and herring fisheries, but the nets are specific to each 
fishery - i.e., neither salmon purse-seine or gillnet gear 
can be used to harvest herring, and vice versa. These 
gear-types are most efficiently used to harvest schooling IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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species of fish, which includes three species of salmon 
(chum, sockeye and pink) and all herring. Troll gear is 
employed only in the salmon fishery and is primarily 
used to target the non-schooling species (coho and 
chinook). Many salmon harvesting operations employ a 
combination of gillnet and troll gear, allowing them to 
efficiently harvest all species of salmon. Longline gear 
may be interchangeably employed in both the halibut and 
sablefish fisheries, while trap gear is specific to sablefish. 
The above considerations imply that harvesting 
operations employing the combination gear-type are the 
most flexible across species; fishers employing
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these gear-types will, ceteris paribus, have more ex post 
exchange alternatives than fishers employing less flexible 
gear-types. 
  Consider next the impact, if any, of each harvesting 
technology on the perishability of the intermediate 
product. Perishability is partially determined by the 
nature of the species themselves: salmon and herring are 
naturally more perishable than sablefish and halibut. The 
more perishable is a vessel-load of fish, the less time a 
fisher has to find a buyer, and thus the fewer are the 
exchange alternatives. Smaller harvesting operations are 
able to extend the time between catch and delivery by 
conducting on-board dressing (gutting and heading) and 
freezing. The nature of the purse-seine technologies is 
such that very large volumes of fish are harvested per 
period, making it difficult to engage in on-board 
processing. They are thus restricted to delivering fish “in 
the round”.
5 Fishers employing any of the other 
harvesting technologies have the option of delivering fish 
in the round, dressed, or frozen.
6 
The market for harvested fish consists of licensed buyers 
with some combination of canning, brining, smoking and 
cold-storage facilities. Each harvesting operation 
produces an intermediate product that is suitable for one 
or more types of processing. Herring is valued primarily 
for its roe; in 1988
7, thirty-five buyers were licensed to 
produce roe herring through a brining process. The vast 
majority of salmon is directed toward either the canned, 
fresh, or frozen markets. There were 129 enterprises 
licensed to process salmon in 1988; of these 126 were 
licensed to operate cold storage facilities, while only 13 
were licensed to operate a commercial salmon cannery. 
In addition to the relevant demand and cost conditions 
for processed fish, the choice of product-form is IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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determined both by the species’ natural suitability to a 
particular form of processing as well as the effect of the 
harvesting technique on the raw product. Net-caught 
salmon tends to be suitable for the canned market, partly 
due to the nature of the target species themselves
8, and 
also because the fish are frequently marked and bruised 
by the nets. This latter problem is less pronounced for 
gillnetters than for seiners. Thus, the ex post exchange 
alternatives available to salmon seiners are quite limited. 
Troll-caught salmon, halibut and sablefish may be sold to 
any buyer with cold-storage facilities, implying fishers 
using these techniques have many ex post opportunities. 
Ninety-seven establishments were licensed to process 
“other finfish”, which includes sablefish and halibut. 
Halibut and sablefish final product-forms include fresh, 
frozen and smoked products.
9 
While it is difficult to determine a precise ranking of 
asset-specificity across harvesting technologies, the above 
discussion leads to the following qualitative comparisons. 
The annual investment undertaken by a purse-seiner is 
identified as the most transaction-specific. The 
investment cost is likely to be recovered only through 
transactions with relatively few potential buyers. The fact 
that these buyers are geographically dispersed, combined 
with the high perishability of the intermediate product, 
implies very few delivery alternatives for such a fisher. 
The possibility that processing capacities are binding ex 
post further limits the expected market for the fisher’s 
harvest. Single-licensed vessels employing only sablefish 
traps rank next in the specificity ranking, followed by 
single-licensed vessels employing only gillnets. The 
above discussion implies that vessels equipped with only  
troll gear or with longline gear are more flexible than the 
aforementioned operations. Harvesting operations 
employing multiple licensed vessels with combination 
troll/gillnet gear are identified as having the least 
transaction-specific investment. This ranking across gear 
types is based on the combined considerations of: 
flexibility of the gear across species; the natural 
perishability of the species targeted by the gear-type; the 
degree of quality control the harvesting operation is able 
to exercise; and the size of the market for the target 
species.  
Consider now the ex post opportunity cost of processing 
inputs. Investments in cold storage and freezing facilities 
are flexible across virtually all fish species and may also 
be employed in non-fish uses. The canning technology, 
however, requires inputs (production line, distilling 
equipment, etc.) that cannot be easily redeployed to 
process species or food products other than salmon 
(Pinkerton).
10 Thus, the annual investment cost in 
canning facilities is specific to transactions with salmon 
seiners and gillnetters. Can we identify a portion of a 
canner’s investment as specific to a particular 
transaction? The processor has invested in a capacity 
associated with a given volume of fish and a portion of 
that investment can be attributed to the transaction under 
consideration; if that investment can be recovered in an 
alternative exchange, then no specific investment has 
been undertaken by the processor. There are over 1,000 
seiners and gillnetters producing an intermediate product 
suitable for the canned market, implying that the canner 
has a very large number of ex post opportunities 
available. However, the seasonal variability in salmon 
runs results in excess processing capacity for those years 
in which salmon runs are low. At times, therefore, the 
processor may find that it is unable to recover its initial 
investment in an anticipated transaction through an 
alternative exchange. Nevertheless, the degree of 
specificity embodied in a processor’s investment, if any, 
is likely to be low, relative to that associated with a 
salmon- or herring-seiner’s harvesting investment. 
3. EMPIRICAL  METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis in Koss (1999) examined contract 
variation across product and technological characteristics 
in both the harvesting and processing sectors. The 
hypothesis is supported if there exists a (significantly) 
positive relationship between the degree of temporal-
specificity in transactions and the use of ex ante credible 
commitments from processors to fishers. In particular, 
the empirical analysis determines the nature of the 
following relationship: 
  ￿￿ ￿￿ Yf Z jj   X  
 Z j   =   D  +  E EX
j   
where Z is the propensity of the exchange to ex post 
hold-up.  Although Z is unobservable, the available data 
indicates whether Z takes on high or low values. High 
values of  Z increase the probability that the transaction 
is conducted under an incomplete, long-term contract. 
Assuming the chance of hold-up is a linear function of 
the vector of explanatory variables Xj, the probit model 
provides a suitable means of estimating the slope and 
intercept parameters of the hypothesized relationship. 
The probability that relationship j is governed by the use 
of an ex ante credible commitment, Y
j, depends upon the 
propensity of transactions between the jth parties to ex 
post hold-up, Z
j, which is in turn dependent upon the 
degree of temporal specificity that characterizes 
relationship j. 
The fisher-processor relationship, j, is identified as being 
governed by the use of credible commitments if at least 
one of the following criteria are met
11: 1. the vessel is IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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fully or partially owned by the processor; or 2. the vessel 
is financed by the processor. The vector of explanatory 
variables, Xi, as defined in Table 1, is intended to capture 
the “degree of temporal specificity” characterizing the 
fisher-processor relationship. The variable CAN accounts 
for the presence of a transaction-specificity in the 
processing technology. For those transactions where 
CAN = 1, we expect the processor to have a greater 
incentive to ensure deliveries are forthcoming by credibly 
committing to an exchange, and thus expect a positive 
estimated coefficient for this variable. The remaining 
variables (SEINE, . . . LONG) serve as proxies for 
capturing the degree of temporal-specificity embodied in 
the harvesting technology. These are five gear-type 
dummy variables with the base category represented by 
“combination gillnet/troll gear”. Positive coefficients for 
each of the variables SEINE, GILL , TROLL, TRAP and 
LONG are expected, as the previous discussion indicates 
that an investment in combination gear is less specific 
than investments in any of these gear-types.  
In order to determine the way in which the observed 
incidence of vertical ties vary across the explanatory 
attributes of the relationship, a stratified random 
sample
12 was  generated from 1988 data in British 
Columbia. The sample consists of 1,830 vertical 
relationships between 726 vessels and 75 buyers.  For 
each of the vessels, the identity of the owner(s) and 
creditor(s) (if any) are known. The distribution of 
ownership shares across owners is also known; thus, each 
transaction can be characterized as belonging to one of 
the following categories: the processor had majority 
ownership in the vessel; the processor had minority 
ownership in the vessel or financed the vessel; or there 
were no observable vertical ties that characterized the 
relationship. The sample represents a cross-section of 
vessels and processors operating in at least one of the 
salmon, herring, halibut, and sablefish fisheries. As 
previously described, the attributes of the intermediate 
product vary both across and within these fisheries, as do 
the harvesting and processing technologies. 
 
3.1  The Ordered Probit Model 
The choice between the three contractual alternatives was 
modeled using an ordered probit analysis. Let Y = 2 if 
the processor had majority ownership in the vessel,  Y = 
1 if the processor had minority ownership in the vessel or 
financed the purchase of the vessel, and Y = 0 otherwise. 
The results of the ordered probit analysis are summarized 
in Table 2. Note that positive coefficients in column 2 of 
Table 2 imply a decrease in the reliance on spot market 
transactions. With the exception of the estimated 
coefficient for GILL, the null hypothesis is rejected with 
at least 95% confidence. In order to interpret the results 
of the ordered probit analysis, the marginal effects are 
presented in columns 3 -5 of Table 2. Column 3 indicates 
the effect of a change in xi on the probability that the 
transaction is completed without any observable 
reciprocal investment; column 4 summarizes the effect of 
a change in xi on the probability that the processor had 
minority ownership or financed the vessel involved in the 
transaction; and Column 5 illustrates the effect of a 
change in xi on the probability that the processor had 
majority ownership in the vessel. Both the signs and the 
relative magnitudes of the marginal effects are consistent 
with paper’s hypothesis. Transactions with canners are 
26% less likely to be conducted on the spot market than 
transactions with processors or buyers without canning 
facilities; and the probability that a vessel is minority-
owned or financed by the processor increases by 4% if 
the processor operates a canning facility; similarly, the 
probability that a vessel is majority owned by the 
processor increases by 22% if the processor operates a 
canning facility. 
The marginal effects for the gear-type dummy variables 
are interpreted relative to the base category, 
“combination gear”. Thus, relative to a transaction in 
which combination gear is employed, the probability that 
Y = 0 decreases when any of the other gear-types are 
employed. Further, this effect is more pronounced for 
gear-types which have been identified as the most 
temporally-specific, seine gear and trap gear. Vessels 
employing seine gear and trap gear are more likely to 
require a credible commitment from a processor than are 
the other gear-types.  
The foregoing empirical analysis indicates a strong 
correlation between the incidence of vertical ties and the 
degree of temporal specificity in transactions. This 
correlation supports the hypothesis that ex ante 
reciprocal investment serves as an endogenous 
enforcement mechanism to transactions that are 
potentially threatened by post-contractual opportunistic 
hold-up. 
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Table 1: Independent Variables 
CAN  =  1  if the jth relationship involves a processor that has invested in canning  facilities 
 =  0  otherwise 
SEINE  =  1  if the jth relationship employed either herring or salmon seine gear 
 =  0  otherwise 
GILL  =  1  if the jth relationship employed gillnet but not troll gear 
 =  0  otherwise 
TROLL  =  1  if the jth relationship employed troll gear but not gillnet gear 
 =  0  otherwise 
TRAP  =  1  if the jth relationship employed trap gear 
 =  0  otherwise   
LONG  =  1  if jth relationship employed longline gear 
 =  0  otherwise 
 
4.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
FISHERY MANAGEMENT POLICY 
What implications does the above finding have for 
fishery management policies? In particular, if the goal of 
fishery management is to maximize the value of the 
fishery, then policy should not hinder the use of 
contractual tools that serve to accommodate or promote 
efficient transactions. The dilemma facing policy-makers, 
however, is that such tools often simultaneously lead to 
an increase in the concentration of market power among 
a small group of processors.  
In order to prevent the accumulation of market power 
among a few processors, Canada’s Davis Plan (1968) 
limits direct processor ownership of the salmon fleet to 
12%. This limitation requires fishers and buyers to 
search for other, possibly more costly means of 
establishing vertical ties. It would be helpful for policy-
makers to distinguish between contractual practices that 
are motivated by the pursuit of market power and 
contractual practices that serve to enhance economic 
efficiency by lowering transaction costs.  
The objective of fishery management policy has primarily 
been to reduce harvesting effort in order to promote 
sustainable catches. Many of these policies impose 
constraints on fishers that render their harvesting 
investments more specific to a small group of processors. 
Oftentimes fishery regulations make the harvesting 
technology less flexible across fisheries or across species 
within a fishery and result in an intermediate product 
that is suitable to fewer processing techniques.  
Open-access regulations generally take the form of 
restrictions on how, when and where fish may be caught, 
which fish and how many fish may be caught. Some of 
these open access regulations tend to reduce the 
flexibility of a harvesting operation across species and 
product form, possibly reducing the number of potential 
buyers available to a fisher. If vessels are restricted to 
employing only one kind of gear-type for example, they 
may lose access to particular species or sub-species. 
Seasonal restrictions for purposes of managing catch 
levels are likely to result in fishers investing in larger 
fishing capacities – larger loads of fish are more 
perishable, increasing the degree of temporal specificity. 
Area restrictions may result in an increased cost of timely 
access to some processors.  
Findings from the investigations of limited entry 
programs are that fishers readily find means of 
increasing fishing capital and power in order to capture 
the increased rents that become available. Fishery 
managers responded by first restricting vessel tonnage, 
then vessel length. Bans were then imposed on splitting 
licenses, combining licenses, transferring to different 
gear types, etc. (Wilen, 2000). Thus, many regulations 
that accompany limited entry programs have also tended 
to reduce the ex post exchange alternatives available to 
fishers. 
The foregoing empirical findings suggest that, in order to 
avoid the increased potential for ex post hold-up, a 
rational and efficient response to the introduction of such 
restrictions is the reciprocal investment by processors in 
vertical ties with the harvesting operation.  
Individual transferable quotas have emerged as the 
economists’ favored solution to the over-fishing problem. 
Under this regime, fishers’ incentives for ‘capital 
stuffing’ disappear, as does the need for a myriad of 
restrictions on the flexibility of the harvesting 
technology. It has also become apparent that ITQ IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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programs provide fishers with an incentive to produce 
raw products that would sell in higher valued markets 
(Wilen, 2000). These implications and findings suggest 
that, under a system of ITQs, fisher and processors will 
reduce their dependence on long-term exclusive contracts 
accompanied by reciprocal investments.  
This discussion suggests that vertical ties between fishers 
and processors are more likely to exist under regimes of 
open access regulations and limited entry programs, 
relative to regimes governed by ITQs.  Since vertical ties, 
in and of themselves, are not necessarily undesirable, this 
should not be interpreted as yet another advantage of 
ITQs over open access or limited entry regimes. This 
conclusion does offer insight to policy makers who may 
be concerned about the motivation of contractual 
arrangements. Policies which restrict harvesting and 
processing technologies to exchanges with only a few 
parties can be anticipated to induce contractual behavior 
which appears to be anti-competitive. To the extent that 
vertical ties lead to enhanced market power of a small 
group of processors, however, ITQs are to be preferred 
over open access and limited entry regimes. 
 
Table 2: Estimated Coefficients and Marginal Effects
13 of the Ordered Probit Regression 
Variables Coefficient 
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i x
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  w ) 2 ( (Pr
 
CONSTANT  -1.14     
  (-21.70)     
CAN 0.714 -0.26 0.04  0.22 
 (14.17;  301.78)14     
SEINE 1.45  -0.50  0.06  0.44 
  (25.62;  379.59)     
GILL 0.11 -0.04 0.01 0.04 
 (1.31;  .207)      
TROLL 0.17  -0.06  0.01  0.05 
 (2.07;  2.70)      
TRAP  1.48  -0.40 -0.13   0.53 
 (13.29;  35.23)      
LONG 0.43  -0.15  0.01  0.14 
 (5.29;  2.62)      
P  1.02     
 (35.11)15     
Pseudo-R2 0.6216     
*  The pseudo-R
2 is the likelihood ratio index, U
2 1  ￿
L
L
(￿
(￿
E￿
E￿
+ , where  L(￿ E￿ is the log-likelihood of the unconstrained 
model and  L(￿ E￿
+  is the log likelihood of the model defined by the null hypothesis. 
 
ENDNOTES 
 
1   This type of arrangement corresponds to 
Williamson’s “discrete transactions” paradigm 
 
(Williamson, 1975). 
2   This term is introduced by Masten, Meehan and 
Snyder (1991). Temporal specificity has also been 
investigated in the bulk shipping market by Pirrong IIFET 2000 Proceedings 
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(1993). 
3   It is assumed here that Rij is greater for this pair of 
processor-harvester than for any other. That is, fisher 
i and processor j are the optimal match from among 
all transactors.  
4  Purse-seine vessels set a large net around schools of 
fish and then close off the bottom of the net with a 
purse-line; operation of this gear requires several 
crew members, a large motorized vessel, a power 
block to hoist the net, and a power drum to roll the 
net. The gillnet method entails the stringing of a net 
from behind a boat across a river, inlet, or passage in 
order to entangle and drown salmon on their 
spawning migration; this technique requires a 
relatively small vessel, a single-handed crew, a 
motor, net drum and nylon nets. Troll fishing is 
conducted by attaching fishing lures to lines 
extending from poles on the vessel, which are then 
towed behind the vessel at various depths; the size of 
the crew varies across vessels, but is generally 
smaller than that of a purse-seine vessel and larger 
than that of a gillnetter. Halibut and sablefish are 
harvested by the longlining method, whereby a long, 
set line, to which are attached regularly spaced short 
lines and baited hooks, is lowered to the sea bottom. 
The use of trap gear involves baiting large conical 
traps and attaching them to ground-line gear, which 
are then set on the sea bed (Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans, Vancouver, B.C.). 
5  Fish delivered in the round are not gutted or headed, 
nor are they frozen on board. 
6  Many seiners have invested in a “champagne cooling 
system”, a large tank holding slushed ice, which 
does serve to protect the catch for longer periods. 
However, virtually all trollers, combination vessels, 
sablefish trappers and longliners are equipped with 
ice-packing and/or freezing facilities, enabling them 
to preserve their catches for longer periods and at a 
higher quality than seiners (Shaffer, 1979). 
7    Data used in the empirical analysis are from the 
1988 fishing season. 
8  Pink salmon, for example, is marketed almost 
exclusively in canned form, owing both to the 
unattractive “hump” on its back and its high oil 
content. The flesh of the chum species deteriorated 
rapidly when it enters fresh water, making it more 
suitable for the canned market if caught in fresh 
water. Sockeye salmon is also suited to the canned 
 
market as a result of its high oil content, but is also 
valued in fresh or frozen form (Shaffer, 1979). 
9  Fisheries Production Statistics of British Columbia, 
1988, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
10  The same is true for the investment in the brining 
inputs required to produce roe herring , although the 
size of the investment is lower than for canning 
inputs. 
11  It is important to note that other types of vertical ties 
(e.g., processor-provision of moorage, storage space, 
vessel maintenance) are also indicative of the use of 
credible commitments. Unfortunately, information 
on these variables is unavailable. 
12  Observations have not been drawn at random from 
the population, but are randomly drawn within 
particular strata. That is, the data are deliberately 
sampled so that both spot-market and each type of 
long-term contract transaction is adequately 
represented in the sample. Since, for example, 
processor-owned vessels constitute only 12% of all 
vessels in the population, a random sampling 
technique would result in a very few number of 
observations exhibiting this characteristic. Thus, of 
the 726 vessels in the sample, 50% meet one of the 
above criteria for a long-term contract, while the 
other 50% do not. Within each strata, however, the 
vessels used in the sample were selected randomly. 
13    The marginal effects of the each of the binary 
variables have been computed by comparing the 
probabilities that result when the variable takes its 
two different values with those that occur with the 
other variables held at their sample means (Greene, 
1997). 
14   Bracketed values denote (t-ratio; LR test of 
significance). Under both the t-test and the LR test, 
the variables CAN, SEINE,  and TRAP are 
significant at at least  the 1% level of significance. 
The variables TROLL and LL are significant at 5% 
level under the t-test, but at slightly less than the 
10% level under the LR test. The variable GILL is 
insignificant under both tests.  
15   Here, the bracketed value is the t-ratio. 
16   Judge et. al., 1985: 767. 
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